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When will we have AGI?

Experts disagree on when AGI will arrive, with forecasts ranging from the 2030s to the middle of this century.

Updated 53 minutes ago4 min readVersion 2
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Covers: Expert forecasts, surveys of AI researchers, and the technical and conceptual obstacles to building AGI. It does not predict a specific date or cover narrow AI applications.

Also answers: When will AGI arrive? · How far away is AGI? · When will AI reach human-level intelligence? · What year will AGI be created?

The short answer

Evidence-backed AI-prepared starting map

Expert forecasts for AGI cluster around the middle of this century, but with wide uncertainty. A 2018 survey of AI conference attendees found median forecasts of a 50% probability that AI systems could automate 90% of current human tasks within 25 years, and 99% within 50 years; the same respondents put feasible automation of human tasks at 21.5% now, rising to 40% in 5 years and 60% in 10 years. A 2026 policy analysis places a plausible AGI window between 2030 and 2040, or potentially earlier, while stressing substantial uncertainty. A 2025 review notes divergent expert perspectives on both AGI timelines and socioeconomic consequences.123

What this rests on6 independent sources
  • Evidence 18
  • Interpretation 1

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In brief

  1. Surveyed AI experts put a median 50% probability on AI automating 90% of current human tasks within 25 years, and 99% within 50 years.1

    Evidence-backed
  2. A 2026 policy analysis places a plausible AGI window between 2030 and 2040, or potentially earlier, with substantial uncertainty.2

    Evidence-backed
  3. Forecasts depend on who is asked: conference of attendance significantly shifted timelines, with HLAI attendees more optimistic and less uncertain.1

    Evidence-backed
  4. The literature reports divergent expert views on both AGI timelines and its socioeconomic consequences.3

    Evidence-backed
  5. Obstacles discussed include the small number of teams able to compete, weak compute and talent infrastructure in some regions, and fragmented governance.42

    Evidence-backed

At a glance

The picture in numbers

Live · updated just now

2018 survey of AI conference attendees
  • within 25 years50%
  • within 50 years99%
Median forecast probability of AI automating 90% of current human tasks1
2018 survey of AI conference attendees
  • now21.5%
  • in 5 years40%
  • in 10 years60%
Median estimate of human tasks feasibly automated now and ahead1
2026 policy analysis

2030–2040

plausible AGI window

earlier

potentially earlier

Plausible window for AGI emergence2

The evidence behind it

6 sources
  • Reviews of many studies1
  • Other studies and data5

When it was published

Newest from 2026

20192026
Sources on this page by kind and year
SourceKindYear
Forecasting Transformative AI: An Expert SurveyOther studies and data2019
Europe and the Geopolitics of AGI: The Need for a Preparedness PlanOther studies and data2026
Pathways to AGIOther studies and data2026
The Forthcoming AGI Revolution: Its Impact on Society and FirmsOther studies and data2025
Review of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI): Implications for the U.S. Workforce and Economic StabilityReviews of many studies2025
The race for an artificial general intelligence: implications for public policyOther studies and data2019

The community around it

No one has added to this page yet. Firsthand experience, a newer study or a different reading of the numbers would show up here, credited to you.

What it means for you

Which fits you?

Pick the situation closest to yours. Each answer says what it rests on.

If you are planning workforce or education policy

the reviewed literature points to reskilling and upskilling, and to critical gaps in workforce preparedness, as the areas needing proactive measures.36

Evidence-backed

If you are assessing regional readiness for advanced AI

the 2026 analysis identifies compute infrastructure, talent retention, industrial adoption and coordinated policy as the gaps to close, and recommends building institutional capacity for AGI situational awareness.2

Evidence-backed

If you are thinking about competition and governance in AGI development

one analysis argues the number of competing teams is unlikely to be large, and recommends taxing AI and using public procurement to reduce pay-offs, raise required R&D and incentivise cooperation.4

Evidence-backed

If you want a single planning number for when AGI might arrive

the sources do not converge on one; the closest is a plausible 2030–2040 window with substantial uncertainty, alongside survey medians of 25 years for 90% task automation.21

Interpretation

If you are weighing societal risks of AGI

the scenarios range from utopian synergy to existential risk, with ethical governance, equitable access and international cooperation proposed as mitigations.6

Evidence-backed

The full story · 3 chapters

01

What the forecasts say

AI summary:Surveys and analyses give wide-ranging AGI timelines, from a 2030-2040 window to median expert forecasts of decades.

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: The most concrete numbers come from a survey of attendees at three AI conferences (ICML, IJCAI and HLAI) in summer 2018. Respondents estimated a median of 21.5% of human tasks could feasibly be automated at the time, rising to 40% in 5 years and 60% in 10 years. Their median forecast was a 50% probability of AI systems capable of automating 90% of current human tasks in 25 years, and 99% of current human tasks in 50 years. The authors conclude that AI experts expect major advances to continue over the next decade with likely transformative impacts on society.1

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: A 2026 analysis drawing on empirical capability trends, expert forecasting surveys and policy analysis finds a plausible window for AGI emergence between 2030 and 2040, or potentially earlier, while noting substantial uncertainty remains. The same analysis argues AGI could fundamentally alter the global distribution of economic and military power, intensify interstate competition, and strain existing governance frameworks.2

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: A 2025 review of AGI's implications for the workforce synthesises the literature and reports divergent expert perspectives on both AGI timelines and its socioeconomic consequences, highlighting critical gaps in workforce preparedness. It does not converge on a date.3

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02

Technical and structural obstacles

AI summary:Analysts point to few competing teams, weak compute and talent infrastructure, and fragmented governance as barriers.

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: One line of analysis treats AGI as a winner-takes-all race in which only the most competitive teams participate, and argues that given the difficulty of AGI the number of competing teams is unlikely ever to be very large. It also holds that the possibility of an intermediate prize would raise the probability of finding the dominant AGI application, making public control more urgent, and recommends taxing AI and using public procurement to reduce contestants' pay-off, raise the R&D needed to compete, and incentivise cooperation.4

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: The 2026 policy analysis identifies critical gaps in Europe's positioning: limited strategic awareness of frontier AI progress, structural weaknesses in compute infrastructure and talent retention, low rates of industrial AI adoption, and fragmented policy responses at EU and Member State level that do not match the potential scale of disruption. It calls for a coordinated preparedness agenda covering institutional capacity for AGI situational awareness, a stronger position in the AI value chain, and frameworks for international stability.2

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: A pathways study asks which decision points acted as leverage nodes, which dead ends reveal alternatives that did not become dominant, and how trajectories differ across frontier proprietary models, open-weight models, and domain or sovereign models. It asks what socio-technical development programmes could plausibly move toward AGI-adjacent capability while meeting requirements for transparency, moderation, wellbeing and sustainable business models.5

03

What arrival would mean

AI summary:Papers sketch scenarios from utopian synergy to existential risk and urge reskilling, cooperation and ethical governance.

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: A 2025 paper presents four scenarios for AGI's societal and economic impact, ranging from utopian synergy to existential risks, and examines cognitive automation, ethical governance and equitable access. It proposes recommendations for governments, firms and educational institutions centred on reskilling, international cooperation and ethical frameworks, to foster inclusive prosperity while mitigating risks such as job displacement and inequality.6

Evidence-backed

Evidence-backed: The workforce review analyses job displacement risks, emerging employment paradigms, wage dynamics, and the need for reskilling and upskilling, alongside concerns about preparedness, timelines and responsible governance. It urges proactive measures from policymakers, educators and individuals.3

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What to remember

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  1. Surveyed AI experts put a median probability on AI automating 90% of current human tasks within 25 years, and 99% within 50 years.

  2. A 2026 policy analysis places a plausible AGI window between 2030 and 2040, or potentially earlier, with substantial uncertainty.

  3. Forecasts depend on who is asked: conference of attendance significantly shifted timelines, with HLAI attendees more optimistic and less uncertain.

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  1. 1
    Forecasting Transformative AI: An Expert Survey
    arXiv (Cornell University) (Gruetzemacher et al.)Published Jan 24, 2019Checked Oct 10, 2026
    “A survey was administered to attendees of three AI conferences during the summer of 2018 (ICML, IJCAI and the HLAI conference). The survey included questions for estimating AI capabilities over the next decade, questions for forecasting five scenarios of transformative AI and questions concerning the impact of computational resources in AI research. Respondents indicated a median of 21.5% of human tasks (i.e., all tasks that humans are currently paid to do) can be feasibly automated now, and that this figure would rise to 40% in 5 years and 60% in 10 years. Median forecasts indicated a 50% probability of AI systems being capable of automating 90% of current human tasks in 25 years and 99% of current human tasks in 50 years. The conference of attendance was found to have a statistically significant impact on all forecasts, with attendees of HLAI providing more optimistic timelines with less uncertainty. These findings suggest that AI experts expect major advances in AI technology to continue over the next decade to a degree that will likely have profound transformative impacts on society.”
  2. 2
    Europe and the Geopolitics of AGI: The Need for a Preparedness Plan
    arXiv (Cornell University) (Negele et al.)Published May 13, 2026Checked Oct 10, 2026
    “Drawing on empirical trends in AI capabilities, expert forecasting surveys, and policy analysis, we find that a plausible window for AGI emergence falls between 2030 and 2040, or potentially earlier, though substantial uncertainty remains. Our analysis of the geopolitical implications suggests that AGI could fundamentally alter the global distribution of economic and military power, intensify interstate competition, and strain existing governance frameworks. Assessing Europe's current positioning, we identify critical gaps: limited strategic awareness of frontier AI progress, structural weaknesses in compute infrastructure and talent retention, low rates of industrial AI adoption, and fragmented policy responses at both EU and Member State levels that do not match the potential scale of disruption.These findings point to a need for a coordinated European preparedness agenda. We outline policy options centred on building institutional capacity for AGI situational awareness, strengthening Europe's position in the AI value chain, and developing frameworks for international stability in an era of increasingly capable AI systems.”
  3. 3
    Review of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI): Implications for the U.S. Workforce and Economic Stability
    International Journal of Innovations in Science Engineering and Management. (Joshi)Published Jun 19, 2025Checked Oct 10, 2026
    “This paper further provides a comprehensive review of the predicted and potential impacts of AGI on the global job market. We analyze key themes including job displacement risks, emerging employment paradigms, and policy considerations in preparation for AGI integration. Drawing upon recent literature, we explore various facets, including job displacement, the emergence of new roles, economic implications such as wage dynamics, and the critical need for workforce adaptation through reskilling and upskilling initiatives. Furthermore, we delve into the societal and ethical considerations surrounding AGI's development and deployment, including concerns about preparedness, timelines for its arrival, and the imperative for responsible governance. By synthesizing diverse perspectives, this review aims to offer a holistic understanding of how AGI could reshape employment landscapes, urging proactive measures from policymakers, educators, and individuals to navigate this evolving future. The synthesis reveals divergent expert perspectives on both AGI timelines and socioeconomic consequences, highlighting critical gaps in workforce preparedness.”
  4. 4
    The race for an artificial general intelligence: implications for public policy
    AI & Society (Naudé & Dimitri)Published Apr 22, 2019Checked Oct 10, 2026
    “It is established that, in a winner-takes-all race, where players must invest in R&D, only the most competitive teams will participate. Thus, given the difficulty of AGI, the number of competing teams is unlikely ever to be very large. It is also established that the intention of teams competing in an AGI race, as well as the possibility of an intermediate outcome (prize), is important. The possibility of an intermediate prize will raise the probability of finding the dominant AGI application and, hence, will make public control more urgent. It is recommended that the danger of an unfriendly AGI can be reduced by taxing AI and using public procurement. This would reduce the pay-off of contestants, raise the amount of R&D needed to compete, and coordinate and incentivize co-operation. This will help to alleviate the control and political problems in AI. Future research is needed to elaborate the design of systems of public procurement of AI innovation and for appropriately adjusting the legal frameworks underpinning high-tech innovation, in particular dealing with patenting by AI.”
  5. 5
    Pathways to AGI
    arXiv (Cornell University) (Fletcher & Khan)Published May 7, 2026Checked Oct 10, 2026
    “This conditioning of any view regarding AGI does lead the discussion in specific directions and to certain conclusions regarding the future. However, adopting this perspective enables the work to offer some final recommendations. We set out to ask the following questions, 1. What are the critical pathways that produced the current dominant generative AI tools (capabilities, product forms, adoption patterns)? 2. Which decision points acted as leverage nodes (small changes that had large downstream effects), and which dead ends reveal alternative possibilities that did not become dominant? 3. How do pathways differ across three foundational-model trajectories such as the frontier proprietary models, open-weight models or specific domain and sovereign models? 4. Which alternative projects branched from key leverage nodes, what is their current state, and why did some succeed, stall, fail or become absorbed? 5. Based on this analysis, what socio-technical development programmes could plausibly move toward AGI-adjacent capability while meeting requirements for transparency, moderation, wellbeing and sustainable business models?”
  6. 6
    The Forthcoming AGI Revolution: Its Impact on Society and Firms
    Preprints.org (Makridakis & Michailides)Published Aug 6, 2025Checked Oct 10, 2026
    “This paper examines the transformative impact of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), poised to redefine society and organizations by surpassing narrow AI's capabilities. Drawing on historical technological revolutions, we analyze AGI’s potential to enhance problem-solving, address global challenges like climate change and healthcare disparities, and reshape labor, governance, and human purpose. Through a human-AI collaborative approach, we present four scenarios—ranging from utopian synergy to existential risks—to assess AGI’s societal and economic implications. Key considerations include cognitive automation, ethical governance, and equitable access. We propose actionable recommendations for governments, firms, and educational institutions, emphasizing reskilling, international cooperation, and ethical frameworks to ensure AGI fosters inclusive prosperity while mitigating risks like job displacement and inequality.”

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  • How should AGI be defined for forecasting purposes, and does automating 90% of current human tasks count as AGI or as a narrower capability milestone?

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  • Why do expert forecasts diverge so much, and how much of the spread reflects different assumptions about compute, data and research organisation?

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  • Would an AGI race concentrate development in a few teams, and how would an intermediate prize change incentives and public control?

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  • Which preparedness measures — compute infrastructure, talent retention, industrial adoption, governance — matter most before any plausible AGI window?

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