Zuckerberg wins Meta deal to help him foot bill for possible California billionaire tax

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1. 1

   Zuckerberg wins Meta deal to help him foot bill for possible California billionaire tax

   BBC NewsPublished Oct 22, 2026Checked Oct 23, 2026

   “Meta has agreed to a new deal with chief executive Mark Zuckerberg to prevent him from leaving California over a proposed state tax on billionaires. The agreement gives Zuckerberg, whose wealth is estimated to exceed $200bn (£149bn), even more shares in Meta to make up for the fraction of his fortune he may lose if the tax wins voter approval in November. The measure would impose a one-time 5% tax on residents with a net worth of more than $1bn. It would likely see the Facebook co-founder pay around $10bn in additional state taxes. He secured the deal with a special committee of Meta after "robust" and "at several points, contentious" negotiations, according to a Wednesday financial disclosure. California is home to most of the US's technology giants and there are around 225 billionaires who reside in the state, according to the Americans for Tax Fairness campaign group. The wealth of such people, including Zuckerberg, has ballooned in recent years. Meanwhile, his estimated effective tax rate in California was less than 1% , external each year. Nevertheless, Zuckerberg told Meta's board last month that he was thinking of moving his primary residence out of California, and even selling his property in the state. His main homes in Californa are in Palo Alto and Lake Tahoe. Such a move "would be public and inevitably noted and commented upon by company employees", Zuckerberg told the board.”

2. 2

   California Billionaires: Wealth, Taxes, and Wealth Tax Revenue Estimates

   National Bureau of Economic Research (Boll et al.)Published May 1, 2026Checked Oct 23, 2026

   “This group alone holds nearly $1 trillion in business wealth, almost half of total California billionaire wealth. For this group, wealth growth (+322% over 2023-2025) and low taxation (0.04% of wealth in annual California income tax) are more pronounced. The proposed one-off California billionaire tax of 5%, payable over 5 years, is both small relative to California billionaires’ wealth gains and large relative to the taxes they currently pay. We estimate that it could raise about $100 billion, with comparatively minor impacts on income tax revenue. Using empirical estimates of mobility responses to wealth taxation, we find that an annual wealth tax on California billionaires could raise substantial additional revenue even after accounting for income tax losses due to mobility. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.”

3. 3

   The Net Present Value of the California Billionaire Tax Act

   National Bureau of Economic Research (Jaros & Rauh)Published Oct 1, 2026Checked Oct 23, 2026

   “ng the residential real estate holdings of California billionaires, and public announcements of billionaire departures from the state, we estimate the behavioral response and associated revenue loss to this new tax using several different methodologies.Even before accounting for reductions in other tax bases such as the income tax, we estimate that the Act will collect approximately $30 billion (range $28 to 36 billion), less than a third of the $100 billion projected by Galle et al. (2025).This range accounts for the publicly confirmed taxpayer migration that has already eliminated nearly 30 percent of the Act's wealth tax base, applies a litigation-survival discount to the remaining base, and is validated by the wealth tax base elasticity literature.We estimate that California's billionaires contribute $3.3-5.8 billion annually in state income taxes.The present value of permanently lost income tax collections from departures more than offsets the one-time wealth tax revenue, yielding a net present value of negative $38.9 billion.Across 100,000 simulated revenue and discount rate combinations, 85 percent of plausible outcomes produce a negative net present value of state revenues.”

4. 4

   Taxing Billionaires: Estate Taxes and the Geographical Location of the Ultra-Wealthy

   National Bureau of Economic Research (Moretti & Wilson)Published Oct 1, 2019Checked Oct 23, 2026

   “eral credit.In 2001, the credit was eliminated and their estate tax liabilities suddenly became highly dependent on where they live.We find the number of Forbes 400 individuals in estate tax states fell by 35% after 2001 compared to non-estate tax states.We also find that billionaires' sensitivity to the estate tax increases significantly with age.Overall, billionaires' geographical location appears to be highly sensitive to estate taxes.When we estimate the effect of billionaire deaths on state tax revenues, we find a sharp increase in revenues in the three years after a Forbes billionaire's death, totaling $165 million for the average billionaire.In the last part of the paper, we estimate the revenue costs and benefits for each state of having an estate tax.The benefit is the tax revenue gain when a wealthy resident dies, while the cost is the foregone income tax revenues over the remaining lifetime of those who relocate.Surprisingly, despite the high estimated tax mobility, we find that the benefit exceeds the cost for the vast majority of states.Of the states that currently do not have estate taxes, all but California would experience revenue gains if they adopted estate taxes.”

5. 5

   Behavioural responses to a wealth tax

   Fiscal Studies (Advani & Tarrant)Published Sep 1, 2021Checked Oct 23, 2026

   “In this paper, we review the existing empirical evidence on how individuals respond to the incentives created by a net wealth tax. Variation in the overall magnitude of behavioural responses is substantial: estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth vary by a factor of 800. We explore three key reasons for this variation: tax design, context and methodology. We then discuss what is known about the importance of individual margins of response and how these interact with policy choices. Finally, we use our analysis to systematically narrow down and reconcile the range of elasticity estimates. We argue that a well‐designed wealth tax would reduce the tax base by 7–17 per cent if levied at a tax rate of 1 per cent.”