Trump and Zelensky appear at loggerheads despite Oslo optimism

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1. 1

   Trump and Zelensky appear at loggerheads despite Oslo optimism

   BBC NewsPublished Oct 20, 2026Checked Oct 20, 2026

   “The hug that Trump envoy Steve Witkoff offered Volodymyr Zelensky ahead of this afternoon's talks in Oslo is unlikely to have dispelled the Ukrainian leader's misgivings about the current direction of US policy towards his war-ravaged country. Zelensky posted a video of the moment on social media, with the message "Ukraine is working for peace. I thank our partners for their support!" But given everything that's happened this month, does the Ukrainian leader still regard Donald Trump as a partner? The two men have never been close – that much is obvious – but have they now fallen out once and for all? Both in rhetoric and actions, the past ten days have seen evidence of a rupture as deep as any in their fractious relationship. Just listen to the way they talk about each other. "Zelensky's not a good guy for us to deal with," Trump told Newsmax last week. "Zelensky doesn't know what he's talking about," Trump told a reporter on Monday when asked what he thought of the Ukrainian leader's suggestion that striking a diesel deal with Russia put the US on the wrong side of history. Such personal attacks are typical of Trump's sledgehammer approach to diplomacy. It's hard to know when to take them seriously. In June, he lashed out at Israel's prime minister, saying Benjamin Netanyahu "has no f**king judgement". Four months later, he endorsed Netanyahu enthusiastically, calling him a "great warrior prime minister".”

2. 2

   Russia–United States relations (Wikipedia)

   WikipediaChecked Oct 20, 2026

   “The United States and Russia maintain strategic foreign relations since the establishment in 1991, a continuation of the relationship the United States has had with various Russian governments since 1803. While both nations have shared interests in nuclear safety and security, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and space exploration, their relationship has been shown through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and hostility, with both countries considering one another foreign adversaries for much of their relationship. Since the beginning of the second Trump administration, the US has pursued normalization and the bettering of relations, largely centered around the resolution of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, the relationship was generally warm under Russian president Boris Yeltsin (1991–99). In the early years of Yeltsin's presidency, the United States and Russia established a cooperative relationship and worked closely together to address global issues such as arms control, counterterrorism, and the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

3. 3

   Ukraine–United States relations (Wikipedia)

   WikipediaChecked Oct 20, 2026

   “Bilateral relations between Ukraine and the United States have existed since January 3, 1992. The United States recognized the independence of Ukraine on December 25, 1991 and upgraded its consulate in the capital, Kyiv, to embassy status on January 21, 1992. In 2002, relations between the United States and Ukraine deteriorated after one of the recordings made during the Cassette Scandal revealed an alleged transfer of a sophisticated Ukrainian defense system to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In 2009, the United States announced support for Ukraine's bid to join NATO. According to documents uncovered during the United States diplomatic cables leak in 2010, American diplomats consistently defended Ukrainian sovereignty in meetings with other diplomats. Following the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the United States began to supply military aid to Ukraine and became one of the largest defense partners of the country.”

4. 4

   The narration of status in far-right populist foreign policy: the United States of Trump 2.0.

   Journal of international relations and development (Wehner)Published Feb 3, 2026Checked Oct 20, 2026

   “respect for the status of the US). When narrating a better future, Trump travels to a remote national past to show the possibility of reinstating US stature in the international. While constructing that better future, Trump also starts to unfold a foreign policy story of success to cement the brighter future in a retrospective way given this future has purportedly been previously lived in a more remote national past. Relied on here is symbolic interactionist role theory, strategic narrative analysis and the notion of 'heartland' from populism scholarship; this paper also contributes to the study of narratives of roles and populism in the field of foreign policy analysis by engaging with the IR notion of 'status'. Taking an interpretative analysis approach, this case study shows how far-right leaders like Trump can conceive and play the status or master role of their states in foreign policy via strategic narratives.”

5. 5

   Examining public support for Ukraine's defense against autocratic aggression.

   Nature communications (Rudolph et al.)Published Jan 9, 2026Checked Oct 20, 2026

   “Russia's invasion of Ukraine challenges the liberal international order and tests the capacity of Western democracies to maintain long-term military and financial aid for Ukraine in a foreign war. Understanding whether governments' pledges of resolve are backed by their citizens is crucial for the credibility of these commitments. Here we show, based on survey experiments with 10,011 respondents in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy, that these countries' publics share a similar pattern of preferences. In all countries, citizens strongly endorse Ukraine's sovereignty and self-determination while weighing human suffering and conflict escalation risk, but less so economic costs. However, within countries, attitudes are polarized: roughly one quarter of citizens with pro-Western orientations show firm resolve, whereas another quarter with anti-Western views remain largely indifferent to political outcomes for Ukraine. These divisions indicate that democratic party competition could constrain the unity and durability of Western resolve against autocratic aggression.”