How do ticket touts and resale markets work?
Resale moves tickets to fans who value them more, but costly early-buying effort and fees eat much of that gain, so resale is neither simply good nor bad.
Covers: This page explains how primary ticket sales, touts, and secondary resale platforms operate, including pricing, fees, and the economics of scarcity. It does not provide legal advice or instructions for buying or reselling tickets in any specific jurisdiction.
Also answers: How does ticket touting work? · What is the secondary ticket market? · How do ticket resale sites work? · Why are resale tickets so expensive?
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The short answer
Interpretation AI-prepared starting mapTicket resale is a large, persistent market: brokers and scalpers resell a significant share of event tickets at substantial markups even though promoters and ticketing agencies try to block them, and the secondary market has been estimated as a $4 billion-a-year business in the US. Economists disagree on the net effect. One equilibrium model of major rock…1234
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At a glance
The picture in numbers
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4 billion dollars a year
40%
40 in every 100
+16%
The line marks the baseline it's compared with
The evidence behind it
8 sources- Other studies and data7
- Background1
When it was published
Newest from 2026
| Source | Kind | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Some Economics of Ticket Resale | Other studies and data | 2003 |
| The Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale | Other studies and data | 2009 |
| THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF "PAPERLESS TICKETING" ON SECONDARY MARKETS | Other studies and data | 2013 |
| Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale: A Game Theoretic Analysis | Other studies and data | 2019 |
| Dynamic Pricing Behavior in Perishable Goods Markets: Evidence from Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball Tickets | Other studies and data | 2012 |
| An examination of dynamic ticket pricing and secondary market price determinants in Major League Baseball | Other studies and data | 2013 |
| "10,000 Available" or "10% Remaining": The Impact of Scarcity Framing on Ticket Availability Perceptions in the Secondary Ticket Market. | Other studies and data | 2023 |
| Raye hits back at ticket touts who 'overwhelmed' sign-up for Albert Hall show | Background | 2026 |
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Be the first to voteIn brief
Resale improves who gets tickets, but roughly half that gain is eaten by costly early-buying effort and resale transaction costs in one major concert study.2
Evidence-backedResale prices fall sharply near the event — by 40 percent or more — and dynamic pricing raises the average seller's expected payoff by about 16 percent.4
Evidence-backedWhen one platform controls both primary sale and resale, secondary supply was about 10 percent of comparable conventional tickets and prices were nearly $100 higher.5
Evidence-backed
Have you ever bought a ticket from a resale market (e.g., StubHub, Viagogo, or a scalper)?
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What it means for you
Which fits you?
Pick the situation closest to yours. Each answer says what it rests on.
If you are deciding whether to buy early at face value or wait for the resale market
resale prices for perishable event tickets tend to fall sharply — by 40 percent or more — as the event approaches, so waiting can be cheaper, though availability is not guaranteed.4
Evidence-backedIf you are weighing a ticket sold under a platform-controlled resale scheme such as paperless ticketing
expect much thinner secondary supply and higher secondary prices than for comparable conventional tickets; in one study supply was about 10 percent and prices nearly $100 higher.5
Evidence-backedIf you are trying to judge how scarce a show really is from a listing page
a percentage framing ("10% remaining") makes tickets feel less available than a frequency framing ("10,000 available"), and the gap widens for high-demand events — so the same inventory can read very differently.8
Evidence-backedIf you care mainly about whether resale helps or hurts fans overall
the evidence is mixed: resale improves allocation but roughly half the gain is offset by early-buying effort and resale costs in one concert study, and another model finds no total welfare change in some scenarios.23
Evidence-backedIf you are thinking about policy responses to touting
one model suggests legal restrictions on resale may be less effective at protecting consumers than introducing competition in the primary ticket market.3
Evidence-backedIf you are a seller holding unsold inventory close to the event
dynamic pricing that cuts prices as the event approaches is valuable, raising the average seller's expected payoff by around 16 percent in the baseball resale market studied.4
Evidence-backedThe full explanation
Interpretation AI-prepared starting mapTicket resale is a large, persistent market: brokers and scalpers resell a significant share of event tickets at substantial markups even though promoters and ticketing agencies try to block them, and the secondary market has been estimated as a $4 billion-a-year business in the US. Economists disagree on the net effect. One equilibrium model of major rock concerts finds resale improves allocative efficiency but that half the welfare gain from reallocation is offset by costly effort in the "arrival game" (queuing, refreshing, bots) and by resale transaction costs; a game-theoretic model finds that in some scenarios adding scalpers does not change total welfare at all. Resale prices behave like other perishable-goods markets: sellers cut prices dramatically, by 40 percent or more, as the event approaches, and dynamic pricing raises the average seller's expected payoff by around 16 percent.1234
- Evidence 19
- Interpretation 3
The full story · 3 chapters
01
How primary sales, touts and resale platforms fit together
AI summary:Promoters try to block resale, yet brokers and bots still resell many tickets, and platform-controlled resale cuts supply and raises prices.
Evidence-backed: Tickets are first sold in a primary market by promoters and ticketing agencies, who generally do not support resale for profit and often try to block the secondary market. Despite this, a large number of brokers and scalpers resell a significant fraction of tickets at substantial markups. Courty's explanation draws on the airline ticket-pricing literature: the same capacity and demand-timing problems that make airline pricing complex also make it hard for promoters to capture secondary-market profits or deter brokers.1
Evidence-backed: Online ticketing changed the mechanics of touting. Scalpers gained new technology, and ordinary buyers now compete with "ticket bots" — virtual robots programmed to buy up tickets for resale at higher prices. The secondary ticket market has been described as a $4 billion-a-year business.3
Evidence-backed: Platform control matters. Where paperless ticketing was implemented by TicketMaster, resale had to go through TicketMaster's own resale site (TicketExchange, or its sister site TicketsNow), shutting out other platforms such as StubHub and RazorGator. In a study of over 1,600 tickets, paperless tickets sold in the secondary market at nearly $100 more than comparable conventional tickets, and the quantity available and sold was about 10 percent of comparable conventional tickets — much lower supply and much higher prices, consistent with downstream attempted monopolisation by an upstream supplier.5
Evidence-backed: A single recent news report illustrates the scale of demand pressure on scarce inventory: the singer Raye said there were 1.8 million sign-ups for her 5,000-seat Royal Albert Hall show, and she criticised touts who "overwhelmed" the sign-up. This is a reported figure from one artist about one event, not an independently verified market statistic.6
02
Prices, fees and the timing of resale
AI summary:Resale tickets are perishable, so sellers cut prices sharply near the event, and how scarcity is framed changes buyers' perceptions.
Evidence-backed: Resale tickets are a classic perishable good: once the event starts, unsold inventory is worthless. Sweeting's study of secondary markets for Major League Baseball tickets found that the simplest dynamic pricing models describe both the seller's problem and their behaviour very accurately, explaining why sellers cut prices dramatically — by 40 percent or more — as the event approaches. Dynamic pricing is valuable to sellers, raising the average seller's expected payoff by around 16 percent.4
Evidence-backed: Prices in both primary and secondary markets respond to many demand-side factors. In Major League Baseball, regression models of dynamic ticket prices and secondary-market prices found 10 to 13 significant determinants per model, spanning team and individual performance, ticket characteristics, and time-related factors.7
Evidence-backed: How scarcity is presented changes what buyers think they are facing. In an online experiment, participants shown a "percentage" frame (for example "10% remaining") perceived tickets as less available than those shown a "frequency" frame (for example "10,000 available"), and the effect was larger for high-demand games. Game demand also moderated the effect on perceived availability and on the expected lower rate. This is about perception in a survey, not observed buying behaviour.8
03
Who gains and who loses from resale
AI summary:One concert study finds resale improves who gets tickets but half the gain is offset; another model finds effects depend on the scenario.
Evidence-backed: The clearest welfare result comes from an equilibrium model of major rock concerts that combines primary and secondary transaction data. Buyers in the primary market, including those making costly efforts to "arrive early" for underpriced tickets, act on rational expectations of resale outcomes. The estimates indicate that resale improves allocative efficiency — tickets end up with buyers who value them more — but half of that welfare gain from reallocation is offset by increases in costly effort in the arrival game and by transaction costs in the resale market.2
Evidence-backed: A separate game-theoretic model with a monopolist, scalpers and regular consumers, incorporating an externality effect of concert attendance in the monopolist's revenue, found that in some scenarios including scalpers does not change total welfare. Its policy conclusion is that legal restrictions limiting resale may be less effective at protecting consumers than introducing competition in the primary ticket market.3
Interpretation: The two welfare results are not directly comparable: one measures reallocation gains net of effort and transaction costs in a specific concert dataset, the other reports scenario-dependent total welfare in a theoretical model. Taken together they support the view that resale is not simply good or bad for welfare, and that the answer depends on how much costly effort and fees the market generates.23
Before you go
What to remember
Try to recall each hidden figure before you reveal it. Remembering, not rereading, is what makes it stick.
Touts and resale platforms persist despite promoters' attempts to block them, and the secondary market is large — described as a $ billion-a-year business in the US.
Resale prices fall sharply near the event — by percent or more — and dynamic pricing raises the average seller's expected payoff by about 16 percent.
When one platform controls both primary sale and resale, secondary supply was about percent of comparable conventional tickets and prices were nearly $100 higher.
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- 1Some Economics of Ticket ResaleThe Journal of Economic Perspectives (Courty)Published May 1, 2003Checked Oct 14, 2026
“A large number of brokers and scalpers resell a significant fraction of event tickets at substantial markups and they manage to do so despite the fact that promoters and ticketing agencies do not support resell for profits and often attempt to block secondary market. Why can't promoters capture the profits from secondary markets or at least deter brokers from doing so? I present a simple explanation that borrows from the literature on airline ticket pricing and draw parallels with that literature. I review some evidence consistent with this explanation.”
- 2The Welfare Effects of Ticket ResaleNational Bureau of Economic Research (Leslie & Sorensen)Published Nov 1, 2009Checked Oct 14, 2026
“We develop an equilibrium model of ticket resale in which buyers' decisions in the primary market, including costly efforts to "arrive early" to buy underpriced tickets, are based on rational expectations of resale market outcomes.We estimate the parameters of the model using a novel dataset that combines transaction data from both the primary and secondary markets for a sample of major rock concerts.Our estimates indicate that while resale improves allocative efficiency, half of the welfare gain from reallocation is offset by increases in costly effort in the arrival game and transaction costs in the resale market.”
- 3Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale: A Game Theoretic AnalysisCarolina Digital Repository (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (Lin)Published Aug 21, 2019Checked Oct 14, 2026
“Members of U.S. Congress and several consumer protection groups opposed the merger due to the combined company’s control of ticket sales and concert venues; however, the merger was approved by the U.S. Department of Justice in January 2010. The increasing presence of online ticketing has equipped scalpers with new technology. Regular consumers have to compete with “ticket bots,” which are virtual robots that are programmed to buy up tickets to be sold at a higher price. The secondary ticket market is currently a $4 billion-a-year business. The research in this project examines the change in total welfare when scalpers are introduced. We created our own model of the ticket market incorporating a monopolist, scalpers, and regular consumers. We took into account the externality effect of concert attendance in calculating monopolist’s revenue. Our results suggest that in some scenarios the inclusion of scalpers does not change the total welfare. In order to protect consumer’s interest, legal restrictions limiting ticket resale may not be as effective as introducing competition in the primary ticket market.”
- 4Dynamic Pricing Behavior in Perishable Goods Markets: Evidence from Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball TicketsJournal of Political Economy (Sweeting)Published Dec 1, 2012Checked Oct 14, 2026
“Sellers of perishable goods increasingly use dynamic pricing strategies as technology makes it easier to change prices and track inventory. This paper tests how accurately theoretical models of dynamic pricing describe sellers’ behavior in secondary markets for event tickets, a classic example of a perishable good. It shows that the simplest dynamic pricing models describe very accurately both the pricing problem faced by sellers and how they behave, explaining why sellers cut prices dramatically, by 40 percent or more, as an event approaches. The estimates also imply that dynamic pricing is valuable, raising the average seller’s expected payoff by around 16 percent.”
- 5THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF "PAPERLESS TICKETING" ON SECONDARY MARKETSJournal of Competition Law & Economics (Rascher & Schwarz)Published May 10, 2013Checked Oct 14, 2026
“As implemented by TicketMaster, the secondary or resale market of tickets originally sold by TicketMaster must go through TicketMaster's own resale site, TicketExchange (or its wholly owned sister site, TicketsNow). Preventing other platforms like StubHub, RazorGator, and the like from being used severely limits the resale market. In an empirical study of over 1, 600 tickets, some sold as “Paperless Ticketing” tickets and others sold as conventional tickets, the price in the secondary market for the “Paperless Ticketing” tickets was nearly $100 higher than comparable conventional tickets sold. In addition, the quantity of “Paperless Ticketing” tickets available and sold in the secondary market relative to comparable conventional tickets was about 10 percent. In other words, the supply of “Paperless Ticketing” tickets available for sale in the secondary market was much lower and the prices were much higher. This is consistent with the theoretical findings, and standard economics findings, of downstream attempted monopolization by an upstream supplier.”
- 6Raye hits back at ticket touts who 'overwhelmed' sign-up for Albert Hall showBBC NewsPublished Oct 13, 2026Checked Oct 14, 2026
“The award-winning singer said there were 1.8 million sign-ups for her 5,000-seat Royal Albert Hall show.”
- 7An examination of dynamic ticket pricing and secondary market price determinants in Major League BaseballSport Management Review (Shapiro & Drayer)Published Jun 14, 2013Checked Oct 14, 2026
“Highlights• We examined market factors that influence ticket price.• Pricing determinants were focused on dynamic ticket pricing and secondary market prices.• Four regression models were developed to examine demand-based price determinants.• A variety of factors significantly influenced dynamic ticket price and secondary market price. Determinants ranged from 10 to 13 variables in each model.• Significant variables included an emphasis on team and individual performance factors, ticket-related factors, and time-related factors.”
- 8"10,000 Available" or "10% Remaining": The Impact of Scarcity Framing on Ticket Availability Perceptions in the Secondary Ticket Market.Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland) (Jee & Hyun)Published Apr 18, 2023Checked Oct 14, 2026
“Participants were randomly assigned to one of five treatment conditions (control, percentage frame × low demand, percentage frame × high demand, frequency frame × low demand, frequency frame × high demand) to complete an online survey. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to discern overall differences in the mean likelihood scores of the dependent variable between groups. The results showed that participants presented with the "percentage" frame perceived tickets as less available than those presented with the "frequency scarcity" frame, and the effect was greater for high-demand games. Additionally, game demand moderated the effect of scarcity framing on participants' perceived ticket availability and expected lower rate. Several manipulation checks were applied to ensure the study's validity. The findings of this study have practical implications for ticket marketers in the sport industry to effectively frame scarcity information and facilitate transactions for online buyers and sellers.”
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Open questions
What is the net effect of resale on ordinary buyers' total cost, once higher resale prices, extra effort to buy early, and resale fees are all counted?
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How much of the price and supply gap seen with paperless ticketing comes from platform control itself rather than from the ticket format?
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How effective are bot restrictions and resale limits in practice, compared with opening the primary market to more competition?
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Does scarcity framing change what people actually buy, or only what they say they perceive?
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