How do drone attacks on merchant ships work and who is responsible?
Attacks on merchant ships are mostly drone, missile and naval strikes by non-state groups, with the Houthi Red Sea campaign the best documented.
Covers: This page explains the types of drones and other unmanned systems used against commercial shipping, how such attacks are carried out and their effects, and which state and non-state actors have been identified as responsible. It does not provide operational or technical instructions for carrying out attacks.
Also answers: Who is attacking ships with drones? · How do drone strikes on cargo ships work? · Which groups use drones against merchant vessels? · Are Houthi drone attacks on ships effective?
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Fill in the blank: ?% of Suez Canal transit fell during the 2023–2025 period
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The short answer
Interpretation AI-prepared starting mapAttacks on merchant ships are carried out mainly with drones, missiles and unmanned naval craft launched by non-state armed groups and, in at least one case, suspected state involvement. The best-documented campaign is by Yemen's Houthis, who from mid-November 2023 began targeting international shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, with 145 drone, missile and unmanned naval strikes recorded between 2023 and 2025 on commercial vessels such as the Magic Seas and Eternity C. Separately, Bulgaria's prime minister said two merchant ships were hit by drones off Bulgaria in October 2026 and suspected Russia was behind the attacks. Responsibility is layered: the Houthis conduct the strikes, while Iran's support facilitates them, though much of that conduct is not legally attributable to Iran.1234
- Evidence 15
- Interpretation 1
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Be the first to voteIn brief
The October 2026 attack off Bulgaria, in which two ships were hit and one sank, is attributed only as a suspicion of Russian involvement by Bulgaria's prime minister.3
Evidence-backedWhether attacks on merchant ships justify self-defence, and whether the US–UK responses were proportionate, remain legally contested.6
Evidence-backed
At a glance
The picture in numbers
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145 attacks
50%
50 in every 100
The evidence behind it
6 sources- Other studies and data4
- Background2
When it was published
Newest from 2026
| Source | Kind | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Ship sinks in new drone attack off Bulgaria, PM summons Russian ambassador | Background | 2026 |
| The Red Sea Crisis: ramifications for vessel operations, shipping networks, and maritime supply chains | Other studies and data | 2024 |
| Challenges and Security Risks in the Red Sea: Impact of Houthi Attacks on Maritime Traffic | Other studies and data | 2024 |
| Iran and Its proxies: attribution and state responsibility | Background | 2025 |
| The Legality of the Defensive Measures Taken by the USA and the UK in Response to the Houthi Attacks | Other studies and data | 2024 |
| The Red Sea as A Proxy Front: Iran’s Strategic Use of The Houthis and The Politics of Plausible Deniability (2023–2025) | Other studies and data | 2025 |
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What it means for you
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If you are following the Red Sea situation
treat the Houthis as the actors conducting the attacks and Iran as a facilitator whose legal responsibility is contested, rather than as a directly attributable party.42
Evidence-backedIf you are assessing shipping or supply-chain exposure on Red Sea routes
plan for longer transit times and higher costs and insurance premiums, since traffic shifted substantially to the Cape of Good Hope route.5
Evidence-backedIf you are reading about the October 2026 Bulgaria attack
treat Russian responsibility as an unconfirmed suspicion stated by Bulgaria's prime minister, not an established fact.3
Evidence-backedIf you are interested in the legality of military responses to attacks on shipping
note that it is unclear whether such attacks meet the criteria for self-defence and that proportionality has been questioned.6
Evidence-backedThe full story · 2 chapters
01
What is used against merchant ships, and how attacks unfold
AI summary:The Red Sea campaign used drones, missiles and unmanned naval strikes, disrupting shipping and shifting traffic around the Cape of Good Hope.
Evidence-backed: The documented campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, which began in mid-November 2023, has used drones, missiles and unmanned naval strikes. A 2023–2025 case study counts 145 Houthi attacks of these types on commercial vessels, naming the Magic Seas and Eternity C among the ships struck. The attacks are described as asymmetric operations that disrupt maritime traffic rather than as conventional naval engagements.12
Evidence-backed: The effects are measured in shipping behaviour rather than only in ship damage. Maritime activity fell markedly in the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, with a significant shift of traffic to the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope. That rerouting lengthened transit times and raised operational costs and freight rates, and insurers raised premiums on the route. One study puts the decline in Suez Canal transit at 50% during the 2023–2025 period.52
Evidence-backed: A different and less documented case is the October 2026 attack off Bulgaria, where two merchant ships were hit by drones and one sank. The country's prime minister said he suspected Russia was behind the attacks and summoned the Russian ambassador. This is a suspicion stated by a national leader, not a confirmed attribution, and the report does not describe the drones or how they were launched.3
Who do you think is primarily responsible for drone attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea and nearby waters?
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02
Who is identified as responsible
AI summary:The Houthis carry out the strikes while Iran's support facilitates them, and the legality of US-UK responses remains contested.
Evidence-backed: In the Red Sea, the Houthis based in Yemen are identified as the actors carrying out the attacks on international shipping. Iran's role is described as sponsorship and support that shapes Houthi capabilities, exercised through a strategy of plausible deniability. The relationship is characterised as proxy warfare in which Iranian backing enables operations that undermine energy security and freedom of navigation.12
Evidence-backed: Attribution to Iran in law is harder than attribution in practice. One legal analysis concludes that many of Iran's proxy groups act with a degree of independence that precludes attributing their conduct to Iran, and that states may be better served by holding Tehran to account for breaching primary norms of international law, including Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, rather than for the proxies' acts themselves. The same analysis notes that Iran's support to these groups facilitates conduct in violation of international law.4
Evidence-backed: The responses to the Red Sea attacks raise their own legal questions. The USA and the UK justified defensive measures under the right to self-defence, stressing that attacks on their warships validated those measures. A legal commentary argues that while attacks on merchant vessels by non-state actors may constitute armed aggression, it is unclear whether they meet the criteria for self-defence, and that proportionality may have been disregarded — urging restraint to protect ships while respecting Yemen's sovereignty.6
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The best-documented campaign is the Houthi targeting of Red Sea shipping from mid-November 2023, using drones, missiles and unmanned naval craft, with attacks recorded between 2023 and 2025.
The attacks reshaped trade routes: activity fell in the Gulf of Aden and Suez Canal, traffic shifted around the Cape of Good Hope, and costs, freight rates and insurance premiums rose.
The Houthis carry out the strikes; Iran's support facilitates them, but much of that conduct is not legally attributable to Iran because the groups act with a degree of independence.
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- 1The Red Sea Crisis: ramifications for vessel operations, shipping networks, and maritime supply chainsMaritime Economics & Logistics (Notteboom et al.)Published Feb 20, 2024Checked Oct 13, 2026
“The attack of Hamas on Israel of October 7, 2023, and the military response of the latter in Gaza have made news headlines for much of the last quarter of 2023 and early 2024. The international community has attempted to prevent escalation and the spreading of the conflict to other parts of the Middle East and the wider world. Despite those efforts, a major security situation emerged in mid-November in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab more specifically (map in Fig. 1 ), when Houthi Rebels based in Yemen started to target international shipping transiting through the region. In a matter of weeks, the situation escalated, adversely affecting both shipping and trade.”
- 2The Red Sea as A Proxy Front: Iran’s Strategic Use of The Houthis and The Politics of Plausible Deniability (2023–2025)International Journal of Social Science & Entrepreneurship (israr & Ghani)Published Sep 30, 2025Checked Oct 13, 2026
“The Red Sea has become one of the most strategically consequential maritime theaters in the 21st century, where regional rivalries, proxy warfare, and asymmetric operations converge to shape global economic and security outcomes. Between 2023 and 2025, this corridor became a critical arena for Iran’s regional power projection through its sponsorship of Yemen’s Houthi movement. During this period, 145 Houthis attacks including drone, missile and unmanned naval strikes on commercial vessels such as the Magic seas and Eternity C disrupted maritime traffic, caused a 50% decline in Suez Canal transit, and significantly raised insurance premiums. The study adopts a qualitative case study approach, applying proxy warfare theory and drawing on official reports, open-source intelligence, and secondary literature to trace how Iranian support shapes Houthi capabilities. The findings indicate that these operations undermine energy security, threaten freedom of navigation, and compel regional and international actors to recalibrate maritime strategies. Keywords: , , , , , , ,”
- 3Ship sinks in new drone attack off Bulgaria, PM summons Russian ambassadorBBC NewsPublished Oct 13, 2026Checked Oct 13, 2026
“Bulgaria's prime minister says two merchant ships were hit by drones and he suspects Russia was behind the attacks.”
- 4Iran and Its proxies: attribution and state responsibilityCentAUR (University of Reading) (Maddocks)Published Oct 15, 2025Checked Oct 13, 2026
“Yet the Houthis' attacks on Israel and against Red Sea shipping demonstrate how Iran's support to these groups continues to facilitate their conduct in violation of international law. This article examines Iran's potential responsibility for acts on the part of its proxies that violate its international legal obligations. It assesses first the grounds on which the proxies' acts could be attributable to Iran before addressing Iran's potential responsibility for aiding and assisting its proxies' harmful conduct. Finally, the article considers Iran's potential breach of primary norms of international law, such as the prohibition on the use of force, through its support to the proxy groups. The analysis highlights the varied relationships between Iran and its proxies and the difficulties that arise when seeking to hold Iran to account. Many of the proxy groups act with a degree of independence that precludes the attribution of their conduct to Iran. Other States might therefore be better served by calling Tehran out for its violation of primary norms of international law, including Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions.”
- 5Challenges and Security Risks in the Red Sea: Impact of Houthi Attacks on Maritime TrafficJournal of Marine Science and Engineering (Rodríguez et al.)Published Oct 23, 2024Checked Oct 13, 2026
“The findings reveal a marked decline in maritime activity in the Gulf of Aden and Suez Canal, attributed to security concerns stemming from Houthi attacks, with a significant shift towards alternative routes, notably around the Cape of Good Hope. This shift underscores the broader implications of regional instability on global trade dynamics and the critical nature of maintaining uninterrupted maritime flow. The study also highlights the economic ramifications, including increased operational costs and freight rates due to longer transit times and enhanced security measures. It concludes with a call for improved maritime security protocols and international cooperation to safeguard these strategic maritime pathways. This research contributes to the discourse on transport geography by quantifying the direct impacts of regional conflicts on maritime logistics and proposing strategies for future resilience, emphasizing the intertwined nature of global trade, security, and the urgent need for collective action in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges.”
- 6The Legality of the Defensive Measures Taken by the USA and the UK in Response to the Houthi AttacksLexonomica (Glavica & Brulc)Published Jan 1, 2024Checked Oct 13, 2026
“The article delves into the legality of defensive actions taken by the USA and the UK in response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Despite assertions that such actions are justified under the right to self-defence, legal ambiguities persist in international law. The authors argue that while attacks on merchant vessels by non-state actors may constitute armed aggression, clarity is lacking on whether they meet the criteria for self-defence. The USA and UK stress that attacks on their warships validate their defensive measures, framing them as necessary responses to significant threats. However, the authors contend that the principle of proportionality may have been disregarded, urging restraint in the use of force to safeguard ships while respecting Yemen’s sovereignty. The article underscores the need for a nuanced approach to assessing the legality and necessity of military actions in complex conflict scenarios.”
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Was Russia responsible for the October 2026 drone attacks on merchant ships off Bulgaria, and what evidence supports or contradicts the prime minister's suspicion?
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How reliable is the figure of 145 Houthi attacks between 2023 and 2025, and how many of those struck commercial vessels rather than warships?
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At what point does Iranian support for the Houthis cross from facilitation into conduct attributable to Iran under international law?
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Do attacks on merchant vessels by non-state actors meet the legal criteria for self-defence by third states, and how is proportionality assessed?
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