How do attacks on power infrastructure affect civilians in Ukraine?

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1. 1

   Machine learning reveals drivers of cold-related illness during energy infrastructure attacks in Wartime Ukraine.

   Scientific reports (Marvi et al.)Published Dec 31, 2025Checked Oct 14, 2026

   “We surveyed 2311 households across 24 Ukrainian oblasts during the winter of 2022–2023. One adult per household provided data on demographics, winter preparations, housing, heating, and access to services. Machine learning models were used to predict respiratory infections, symptoms, and cold injuries, based on sociodemographic and household factors. Respiratory infections affected 75.2% of participants, and 3.76% reported cold injuries, rising to 10% among older adults. Larger households experienced more respiratory infections, while areas under Russian control reported higher rates of cold injury. Key predictors of respiratory infections included age, household size, financial stability, and heating practices; cold injuries were predicted by age, region, anxiety, and household size. This is the first study to apply machine learning in examining the health impacts of cold-related events following energy infrastructure attacks in an active conflict zone. Our findings underscore the vulnerability of older adults and the widespread burden of respiratory infections, highlighting the need for targeted cold injury prevention in conflict-affected and cold-climate regions.”

2. 2

   Targeting Through Deprivation: Russia’s Attacks on Ukrainian Energy and Nuclear Infrastructure — An International Humanitarian Law Perspective

   International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION (Bodescu & Petrache)Published Jun 1, 2026Checked Oct 14, 2026

   “This paper develops a single-case study, with three embedded units of analysis, to test the hypothesis that these attacks constitute a method of indirect targeting of the civilian population: they aim to produce sufficient suffering to decouple popular support from the political authority and war aims of the Ukrainian State. The case is examined through the lens of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol I, customary international humanitarian law, and the Rome Statute. Open-source evidence from United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Energy Agency (IEA) and World Bank sources is triangulated to establish a factual pattern on the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard. The paper argues that the systematic, winter-timed and nationwide character of the campaign cannot be reconciled with the dual-use doctrine and generates individual criminal responsibility, consistent with the International Criminal Court arrest warrants issued in 2024 against senior Russian commanders.”

3. 3

   Russian strikes leave 600,000 without power in Ukraine, Zelensky says

   BBC NewsPublished Oct 14, 2026Checked Oct 14, 2026

   “Ukraine's president says "critical" infrastructure was hit overnight, while emergency services say at least three were killed.”

4. 4

   Weaponizing Winter: Energy Infrastructure, Coercive Strategy, and Civilian Vulnerability in the Russia-Ukraine War

   ˜The œregional tribune. (Shahid & Baker)Published Aug 30, 2026Checked Oct 14, 2026

   “Three embedded sub-units are analysed (attacks on electricity and heating power stations in Ukraine, nuclear safety and legal issues at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil power stations). The results show that the line of reasoning about Ukraine's energy system is a punishment/attrition/leverage line instead of capitulation. Official reporting reveals that attacks against power and heating systems enhance civilian impact, particularly during the winter season. The study establishes that the term “dual-use” should not substitute the Article 52 military objective test and that Article 56 precautions should be more specifically considered for nuclear facilities. It concludes that direct comparison of Russian and Ukrainian energy-targeting campaigns is challenging due to differing targets, civilian exposure, and assessment standards. Strategic and IHL assessments are strongest when viewed cumulatively rather than as substitutes for strike-specific legal analysis.”

5. 5

   PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS: A HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY ON ATTACKS AGAINST WATER AND ENERGY FACILITIES IN GAZA AND UKRAINE

   International Journal of Economic Technology and Social Sciences (Injects) (Frahma)Published May 29, 2025Checked Oct 14, 2026

   “Contemporary armed conflicts exhibit increasingly complex patterns of attacks on vital civilian objects, including water and energy infrastructure. This study critically examines the legal protection of non-military civilian facilities such as hydroelectric power plants, reservoirs, and clean water systems from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Using a literature review method based on Human Rights Watch reports and international journal articles published since 2022, the research explores two primary case studies: the 2023 attack on the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant in Ukraine and the destruction of clean water systems in Gaza during 2023–2024. The analysis reveals that both attacks potentially violate fundamental IHL principles, such as distinction and proportionality. Furthermore, the study identifies a normative gap in the explicit protection of vital civilian facilities that directly impact civilian survival. These findings underscore the urgent need for stronger enforcement and normative reform within international legal frameworks to ensure the protection of civilian infrastructure in times of conflict.”